




University of Essex, UK
David Armstrong
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
This article examines the historical construction of depression over about a hundred
years, employing the social life of methods as an explanatory framework. Specifically, it
considers how emerging methodologies in the measurement of psychological constructs
contributed to changes in epistemological approaches to mental illness and created the
conditions of possibility for major shifts in the construction of depression. While
depression was once seen as a feature of psychotic personality, measurement tech-
nologies made it possible for it to be reconstructed as changeable and treatable. Dif-
ferent types of scaling techniques (Likert versus dichotomous scales) enabled the
separation of depressive personality from reactive depression, paving the way for
measuring the severity and intensity of emotions. Techniques to test sensitivity to change
provided a means of demonstrating the efficacy of new psychoactive drug treatments.
Later, more advanced techniques of precision scaling enabled the management of a new
measurement problem, clinician unreliability, associated with the growing number of
professionals involved in mental health care. Through statistical management of
unreliability, the construct of depression has dramatically reduced over this period from
hundreds of questionnaire items to potentially just two. Exploring the history of
depression through this lens produces an alternative narrative to those that have
emerged as a result of medicalisation and the actions of individuals and pressure groups.
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Histories of the growing prevalence of (clinical) depression recognise the importance of
shifts in definition and more intensive case-finding – in other words, there seems agree-
ment that the depression epidemic has been ‘constructed’ in some way rather than
reflecting a significant real increase in mental illness in the population. For most of
these accounts, the main drivers of the epidemic are professionalisation and medicalisa-
tion (Rapley, Moncrieff, and Dillon, 2011). Psychiatrists have been held responsible for
extending their domain – ‘All professions strive to broaden the realm of phenomena
subject to their control’ (Horwitz and Wakefield, 2007: 213) – while the drug industry
and the profit motive have been identified as the driving force (Healy, 2004; Hirshbein,
2009; Shorter, 2013). For other authors, responsibility lies with ‘a too-powerful medical-
industrial complex comprising Big Pharma, insurance companies, testing laboratories,
equipment and device makers, hospitals, and doctors’ (Frances, 2013: 71) or ‘research-
ers, physicians, and patients; advertisers, lobbyists, and public-relations experts; con-
sumer advocates, antidrug crusaders, feminists, and consumers of popular media’
(Herzberg, 2009: 192). Expressed another way, it was ‘the unprecedented number of
interest groups that have stakes in considering a wide variety of behaviors as patholo-
gical’ (Horwitz, 2020: 218).
All these accounts have in common explanations based on various actors who have
extended the reach of the depression diagnosis. As Herzberg (2009: 203) emphasises,
this is ‘a story about people as much as about technologies and drugs’, in which politics
lies behind apparently neutral scientific discoveries. Yet rather than joining this chorus
of blame, this article attempts to make the case that developments in methodologies
themselves have had an agentic role in the conceptual shifts that have emerged in the
construct of depression. Following the idea that methods have a social life (Savage,
2013), this article sets out to study the psychometric origins of depression over a period
of about a hundred years, an aspect that has been ignored or glossed over in existing
historical accounts.
By focusing on measurement technology, we try to make visible an aspect of the
construction of depression that has been largely invisible, or rather, regarded only
through the lens of how successfully or not psychometric measures perform their sup-
posed function. Inverting the lens on measurement and method has been used in socio-
logical studies in related areas. For example, Bowker and Star (1999) have examined the
use of categorisation in a wide range of social and economic domains, including clas-
sification of diseases, arguing that the extent of visibility or invisibility of categorisation
within a process can contribute to the fashioning of political and social order. Similarly,
Espeland and Stevens (2008) consider the social act of quantifying constructs in numer-
ical form, noting that ‘numbers, like words, should be regarded as deeds: acts of com-
munication whose meaning and functions cannot be reduced to a narrow instrumentality
and which depend deeply on “grammars” and “vocabularies” developed through use’. In
quantifying constructs, they argue that constructs can be ‘remade’ and thus direct social
behaviour and generate new forms of authority. Like these authors, this article attempts
to examine the potential power of neutral-seeming instruments to enable or even gen-
erate significant shifts in the conceptualisation of depression.
2 History of the Human Sciences XX(X)
The very word, instrument, suggests something in the laboratory rather than a mun-
dane questionnaire. Accounts of the history of psychiatry sometimes refer to instruments
but in the sense of machines: ‘By the end of the 1980s, the MRI had replaced CAT scans
as the primary instrument of psychiatric research’ (Lieberman and Ogas, 2015: 151).
Questionnaires are mentioned only in passing, if at all. But if psychiatric measurement
has a life of its own, if it creates a reality that human actors then respond to, then it
represents an important, if ignored, aspect of psychiatric history, and the rise of depres-
sion diagnoses in particular. We will revisit some of the secondary literature in our
conclusion, but the main analysis is concerned with the ways in which psychometrics
changed our view of the world of mental illness. As a result, our focus is largely on
primary sources, since secondary sources necessarily start from a different explanatory
point (as indicated above).
Our analysis aims to document the emergence of psychometric approaches to clinical
depression as found in primary source English-language scientific literature, and to
select as exemplars those instruments and their accompanying narratives that were
produced and discussed at the time in leading academic journals, rather than narratives
of measurement devices written from a retrospective stance. Our sources include influ-
ential journals in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, such as the American Journal
of Psychiatry and the British Journal of Psychiatry, understood to represent the most
powerful narratives in these disciplines across Britain and North America. Measurement
tools such as questionnaires travelled across geographical spaces by means of these
sources but also the perspective they helped create. A report on the high prevalence of
depression revealed by using a particular questionnaire established both knowledge of
mental illness and the means of discovering it.
We focus on the narrative and discourse within primary academic texts rather than on
authors, individuals, institutions, and their political and professional affiliations, since
these designations and retrospective understandings of their import, we argue, would
have been produced by the prevailing narratives and their respective dominance or
otherwise. In doing so, we set out to produce an analysis that takes the position that this
context is itself a product of certain retrospective narratives, rather than a determinant,
and therefore obfuscates the analytic frame. The aim of the analysis that follows is to
produce an alternative explanation for the development of the construct of depression in
Britain and North America that can then be weighed against other accounts.
The new measurement regime
Approaches to measuring and documenting depression over the last century have see-
mingly evolved gradually, appearing as a natural iterative process of improved under-
standing of the phenomena associated with depression. Yet we begin by noting the
significant difference between measurement approaches at the start and end of the period
under study. This enables us to frame the question guiding our analysis, which is about
how developments in psychometric technologies may have impacted on such a shift.
The wider context for our analysis is the development of clinical method from the end
of the 18th century, when listening to the patient’s account of their illness began to be
superseded by a theory of pathology that prioritised the clinical examination of the
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patient’s body, to see whether disease could be directly detected (Foucault, 1973). This
innovation was gradually extended during the 19th and 20th centuries as various tech-
nological supports for examining patients’ bodies were introduced, ranging from various
‘scopes’ through to complex imaging and blood analyses. These devices mediated
between the clinician’s senses and the patient’s illness and objectified the problem as
an inscription. Yet despite these revolutionary changes in clinical practice that gained
increasing headway during 19th-century medicine, the work of psychiatrists in the
asylum continued with the older methods of clinical practice that relied on words rather
than physical investigations. While it would have been rare for a patient to report their
own insanity, friends and relatives could make a provisional diagnosis and invite the
clinician to witness the expression of the patient’s disturbed thoughts.
By the early 21st century, however, a large proportion of mental health assessment
instead depended on a new mediating device, the patient-completed questionnaire.
Instead of a psychiatrist listening to and interpreting the patient’s words, the patient
could now be invited to complete a questionnaire that would diagnose without the need
for psychiatric expertise. The PHQ2 (Kroenke, Spitzer, and Williams, 2003), for exam-
ple, consists of two questions. Patients are invited to consider the extent to which, over
the last two weeks, they have been bothered by ‘little interest or pleasure in doing things’
and ‘feeling down, depressed or hopeless’. A simple scoring system and look-up table
offers an estimate of whether or not the patient is clinically depressed.
How is it that unmediated psychiatric diagnoses of the 19th century have been super-
seded by the results of the psychiatric ‘test’? The intervening period was characterised
not only by the introduction of self-completion questionnaires but also by fundamental
changes in the classification of mental disease and in the form and organisation of
psychiatric care. There are numerous narratives seeking to explain these latter broad
shifts in the field of mental illness in terms of the actions and interests of powerful
individuals and groups, as described earlier. This article, however, using the ‘social life
of methods’, considers how the psychometric questionnaire changed the epistemological
landscape of mental illness and created the conditions of possibility for revolutions in
psychiatric classification and care in the second half of the 20th century.
Note cards and psychological tests
Reliance on reports from others and interpretation of patients’ words and conduct meant
that psychiatric diagnosis in the 19th century depended on whatever classificatory frame
was used by the clinician – with the implication that diagnoses of insanity would not
have been made consistently by all clinicians. Clinical records, which were becoming
more important for physical illness in the late 19th century, had less value in the asylum,
where decades of incarceration did not require close monitoring and where a quarterly
‘no change’ entry in the case book would suffice (Andrews, 1998; Turner, 1992). Indeed,
given that records were kept in chronological case books, the emphasis was on repre-
senting the overall numbers of asylum inmates more than the trajectories of individual
patients. It was only in the final decade of the 19th century, when Kraepelin, a notable
German psychiatrist, reported using Zahlkarten (note cards) on every patient, that a
systematised record of insanity began to emerge.
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The note card was a new technology that was interpolated between the patient and the
clinician and originated from ‘census cards for the mentally ill’ devised by the Royal
Statistical Bureau of Prussia in Berlin (Guttstadt, cited in Weber and Engstrom, 1997:
377). Zahlkarten allowed alienists to systematically record ‘remarks on aetiology and
heredity, medical history, age of first and actual onset, duration of treatment, psycho-
pathological status, course of symptoms, correct diagnoses and diagnostic errors’
(Weber and Engstrom, 1997: 379). Psychiatrists no longer needed to debate diagnoses
using narratives reconstructed from successive case books nor parade the patient for all
to make their judgements. Armed only with Zahlkarten as representations of the patient’s
illness, psychiatry had a common experiential base on which to base diagnosis and
classification. It is therefore unsurprising that Kraepelin’s classification of insanity
carried an authority that none of his predecessors had acquired and became a framework
for psychiatric classification in the West for the next century.
About the same time, a new brand of empirical psychology was also seeking a reliable
method for accessing the mind. Using technology taken largely from the anthropometric
laboratory, it was claimed that some measurements, such as reaction times, could be
construed as both physiological and psychological. The new psychological laboratory
therefore examined variations in individuals’ mental functioning by using physico-
psychological tests: attributes such as ‘keenness of sight, the color sense, judgment of
eye (estimation and discrimination of lengths, forms, etc.), touch (discrimination,
weight, pain, etc.), movement (discrimination, rate), time-sense, reaction time, mental
fatigue, memory, association, etc.’ (Titchener, 1893: 187) formed the basis for a new
empirical psychology. Yet, despite attempts to relate these measures to ‘abnormal’
mental functioning (insanity), it was clear a different technology was needed for that
purpose. The origins of that new approach emerged in the late 19th century, with
experiments using a then-novel method of accessing the mind, the questionnaire.
Although the questionnaire was to become the basis for a new mediating device in the
diagnosis of mental illness, the first questionnaires had their origins in the earlier psy-
chological method of introspection. Until the end of the 19th century, psychologists had
considered the best method of examining mental functioning to be through a process of
thinking about one’s own thoughts. But if a psychologist could do this, why not the
psychological subject? The technology for effecting this shift was the questionnaire,
which could extend the laboratory outward but also supplement – and in time replace –
the psychological method of introspection:
Great as have been the contributions of the laboratory to recent psychology, many most
fascinating and important problems as yet resist experimental solution. For the study of
these the investigator is thrown back upon introspection and observation, and, so far as his
introspection is to have extraneous confirmation, upon the questionnaire. (Miles, 1895: 534)
But what questions should be asked, and how should they be framed ‘without at the same
time prejudicing the answers to be received’ (Miles, 1895: 534)? Of particular concern
was the ability of subjects to use introspection, a method in which psychologists had
been specially trained. Questions such as ‘How do you know your right hand from your
left?’, ‘How do you go to sleep when sleepless?’, or ‘What is your favourite colour and
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why do you like it?’ depended on respondents being able to reflect on their own mental
processes: ‘The inability of some respondents to tell how they recall a forgotten name, or
how they set themselves to work when disinclined, shows that these questions approach
the limit of casual introspection’ (ibid.: 558).
The other problem with inviting subjects to conduct their own introspection was how
to analyse their responses. A series of different statements on why red was a favourite
colour needed to be further distilled if inferences about the nature of mental functioning
were to be drawn. In a way, early experiments crystallised both the problems and the
potential of using questionnaires as means of accessing the mind, problems that were to
be overcome and potential that was to be realised over the early decades of the 20th
century.
Scales of emotion: Pushing the limits of introspection
The possibility of quantifying any human attribute by means of questionnaire ‘tests’
opened up psychological constructs to empirical fragmentation. Nineteenth-century
‘character’, for example, could be recast as ‘temperament’ that was held to ‘underlie
and influence all instincts, and which are related to anatomical and physiological dif-
ferences and may in time have correlations therewith demonstrated, such as bodily
energy, general sthenic emotionality, tendency to be phlegmatic’ (Folsom, 1917: 436).
Temperament scales could therefore include emotional reactions such as depression. In
1917, Washburn and colleagues examined respondents’ immediate emotional reaction to
a set of words to identify those who were cheerful and those depressed (Baxter, Yamada,
and Washburn, 1917; Morgan, Mull, and Washburn, 1919). Respondents were ‘normal’
individuals who could express a feeling of depression (along with cheerfulness and either
optimism or pessimism) simply as part of an emotional repertoire without any hint of
pathological melancholia or insanity.
In 1930, Jasper devised another new test for measuring emotions (Jasper, 1930). Forty
questions covered three ‘dimensions’ of depression-elation, optimism-pessimism, and
enthusiasm-apathy. Subjects were asked questions ranging from those about their atti-
tudes towards the future condition of man and their views on morals, war, government,
youth, and the Church; to subjective questions such as ‘I tend to have “blue spells”’ and
those concerning their thoughts about committing suicide, tiredness, and ambition. The
questionnaires were given to college students, refined, edited, and validated against other
measures (such as student grades). The result was a self-report measure of depression-
elation that was ‘practicable for use with large groups of “normal” individuals of the
college age’ (ibid.: 316).
Although Jasper’s questionnaire was developed on and intended for use with ‘normal’
subjects, it was apparent that it could also capture depressive emotions as expressed in
asylum psychiatry. He noted, for example, that diagnoses such as Kretschmer’s hypo-
manic cycloid and depressive cycloid ‘would correspond to the characteristics of the
elative disposition and the depressive disposition’, in effect juxtaposing the label
ascribed through clinical judgement with the quantified precision of the standardised
questionnaire administered to normal populations. Clinical judgement within the asylum
had constructed depressed emotions as secondary features of insanity that could be
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clinically observed and reported in clinical notes. The psychometric test, however, could
elicit these emotions in an ‘objective’ way directly from the patient and quantify them on
a scale enabling ranking and comparability. A patient’s emotional state – cheerfulness or
depression – could be rendered to a certain granularity with precise scores in the relevant
test. It was then a small step to apply the fine-grained technology of psychometric scales
to the dense diagnostic categories of insanity.
The potential for fragmenting and quantifying depressive components of psychiatric
diagnoses was further realised by other new measures of temperament devised during the
1930s that were developed using psychiatric patients. Humm and Wadsworth, for exam-
ple, developed a ‘Temperament Scale’, based on Rosanoff’s personality theory found in
his Manual of Psychiatry, that categorised personalities into normal, hysteroid, cycloid,
schizoid, and epileptoid. The cycloid component was described as
characterized by emotionality, fluctuations in activity, and interferences with voluntary
attention. . . . The depressed phase is manifested by some degree of sadness, lessened activ-
ity, dearth of ideas, and associated characteristics such as worry, timidity, feelings of
malaise, and the like. The manifestations of a general cycloid nature are fluctuations from
emotional equilibrium, hot-headedness, difficulty in sleeping, etc. (Humm and Wadsworth,
1935: 165)
When Miles had proposed the use of questionnaires to elicit mental functions, she had
been concerned that respondents might struggle with the degree of introspection
required. Her concerns were partly mitigated by the simple yes/no format of responses
required by the early psychological tests. Further, temperament was a stable part of an
individual’s identity, so responses to questions such as ‘Are you sometimes so “blue”
that life seems hardly worth living?’ (from the Humm-Wadsworth Scale) were not held
to reflect current mood but something about a more permanent disposition towards
feeling very sad. There were still concerns that even answering these sorts of questions,
and the level of reflection on their own mental processes that entailed, might be beyond
the ability of respondents. Humm and Wadsworth had noted, for example, that ‘the most
serious limitation of their scale was the tendency of some subjects to answer with too
many “yes” responses or too many “no” responses’. Subjects might also be ‘incoopera-
tive’ and ‘answer haphazardly, contrary to fact in a stereotyped manner’ (Humm and
Wadsworth, 1935: 174). Traxler summarised the issue, noting, ‘Since most personality
inventories call for self-estimates on a series of items, the question of the correctness
with which individuals ordinarily make judgments concerning their own personality
characteristics is an important question’ (Traxler, 1941: 62).
Validity and reliability: Separating depressives from depression
Over time, psychometricians developed technologies for evaluating the worth of a ques-
tionnaire test that would dissemble the unreliability of subjects with a variety of tech-
niques, such as face validity, discriminant validity, construct validity, test-retest
reliability, and so on. These tools were first introduced to provide some corrective to
the possibility of respondents being ‘unreliable’, that is, unable to introspect. But as
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confidence in respondents’ abilities to access their mental processes increased, so the
sophistication of how they could be questioned was also extended. In particular, respon-
dents might have the introspective powers to be able not only to answer questions such as
‘Do you find yourself at times very cheerful, and at others very blue?’ (from the Humm-
Wadsworth Scale) but also to offer a more nuanced response in terms of either severity or
frequency. Jasper, for example, could invite respondents to choose from a range of
responses: ‘My most characteristic mood or temperament is: Greatly depressed; Pleasant
and fairly happy; Extremely happy and elated; Very happy; Somewhat depressed’. This
style of response was later formalised by Likert in his eponymous scale (Likert, 1932).
The effect of using Likert scales to measure aspects of temperament dissolved the
immutable character of those mental processes that could be construed as being the
essence of identity. A person might have the temperament of being ‘sad’, but also have
degrees of being sad. Moreover, a person who was not sad by nature might yet have
moments of sadness. While lengthy personality tests produced a set of personality types
that were either present or absent as permanent traits, Likert-type scaling added dimen-
sions of severity and frequency, focusing on a person’s current state. This created the
possibility for depression to be conceived of as either a fixed personality or a changeable
scalable condition.
The questions of test reliability and validity, which had focused on the ability of
respondents to access their mental processes and render these accurately in a question-
naire, then began to address the underlying constructs themselves. If the responses to two
items or two tests tended to agree, then this might indicate not only that the respondents
were answering ‘truthfully’ but also that the underlying construct (depression, say) was a
real entity that the items or tests were accessing. In effect, the test began to reify the
construct; the constructs themselves had become real entities, and the tools had become
fuzzy devices needing refining in order to better weigh the psychological construct and
circumvent subjectivity.
Although developed primarily outside the asylum, the new scales had the potential to
undermine the solidity of the asylum diagnosis of insanity (and its variants). Patients
could still be labelled as insane, but they could also be classified according to their
emotions through the instrument of the psychological test or questionnaire. Emotional
states, expressed in numbers, could be shown to vary in severity and over time: aspects of
mental illness could be construed as labile. Moreover, test results from normal popula-
tions could be shown to overlap with those from psychiatric patients. The implication
was that the binary nature of mental functioning (sane or insane) on which the asylum
system was based was undermined by the psychological test. Interwar changes in the
asylum system, such as the growth of psychiatric outpatients, can be seen as manifesta-
tions of the emerging shifts in classification made possible by the new science of
psychometrics.
Psychiatric scales: Consolidating clinical depression as
changeable
The early 20th-century depression measures, developed mostly outside the asylum, had
taken theories of abnormal personality employed within asylum psychiatry and
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combined these with psychometric measures of temperament in ‘normal’ populations
(mostly college students). In the 1940s, a questionnaire emerged that specifically sought
to measure abnormal personality in medical settings. The Minnesota Multiphasic Per-
sonality Inventory (MMPI) was intended as a psychiatric measuring device for general
medical practice – a comprehensive personality inventory to measure clinically impor-
tant features ‘without regard to the particular phase of personality upon which the item
might bear’ (Hathaway and McKinley, 1940: 43). This would test the limits of the
technological communion between clinical judgement and psychometrics.
The MMPI authors developed various subscales: first hypochondriasis, then depres-
sion, followed by others. The depression scale (Hathaway and McKinley, 1942) initially
had 60 items and was later factor analysed into nine dimensions. Items took the form of
statements that had to be answered ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Cannot say’ in the Thurstone style.
For the depression scale, the authors wished ‘to avoid the identification of the term
depression with anything other than the presence at the time of testing a clinically
recognisable, general frame of mind characterised by a poor morale, lack of hope in the
future and dissatisfaction with the patient’s own status generally’ (ibid.: 74). Whereas
classical psychiatric theory viewed depression, particularly in the form of melancholia,
as a premorbid temperament, the new approach of asking subjects to directly report their
own thoughts characterised it as a changeable or ‘reactive’ condition – one that arose in
response to external conditions or events. ‘It is well recognized that a few patients with a
marked degree of depression on one day may change toward normal within 24 hours’ – a
phenomenon that made it difficult to obtain ‘a group of patients clearly depressed at the
time of testing’ (ibid.). This concept of changeability made it possible to then consider all
the many external factors that an individual might ‘react’ to with a depressive mood:
Such a clinical picture might result from economic or vocational frustration, from personal
problems, from a depressive phase of a cycloid personality, or from any one of the other
commonly known clinical backgrounds of depression. As seen in this way, the measured
depression might represent a less stable trait in the individual than . . . most other measured
personality characteristics. (ibid.)
In freeing depression from melancholic psychosis (psychosis also having been construed
as a personality type), the psychometricians had established depression as a potentially
unstable component of psychological functioning that might react to external events and
situations. Indeed, the term reactive depression had begun to emerge and develop in the
psychiatric literature concurrently with the growth of psychometrics during the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s. An early use of the term shows the emerging separation of ‘reactive’
depression from psychotic (assumed to be premorbid characterological) depression:
Although there were 24 cases classified as affective reactions only six of these could be
counted unquestionably psychotic. The remainder were mild disorders – depressive in
character – where the mood was more in keeping with a real life situation and where the
capacity for social adaptation was only partly affected. These are the cases sometimes
classified as reactive depressions. (Jefferson, 1933: 833)
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In summary, the emergence of psychometric techniques applied to ‘normal’ populations
enabled ‘mild’ forms of temporary (‘reactive’) depression (so far loosely defined) to be
identified among non-incarcerated patients. Psychiatric concepts of depression that
derived from clinical observation of inmates, combined with clinical theory and clinical
judgement, had typically concluded that depression constituted one face of a double-
sided ‘cycloid’ personality. During the 1950s, however, the concept of ‘reactive depres-
sion’ (and ‘neurotic’ depression) became increasingly separated from the concept of a
permanent, incurable, psychotic personality.
Sensitivity to change
In the early post-war years, imipramine, originally tested for antipsychotic effects, was
later believed to have ‘antidepressant’ properties. This new class of drugs did not offer a
‘cure’ but an amelioration of symptoms, and therefore testing for efficacy involved the
application of questionnaire technology rather than cruder clinical judgements. In the
first published study, for example, the effect of imipramine was studied using a fairly
primitive form of psychometric measurement:
The criteria of improvement consisted of 4 items: symptoms’ disappearance (subjective
comfort); ward management; ability to go home; and ability to go to work (social effec-
tiveness). The realization of 4, 3 or 2 of these items was categorized as marked, moderate or
slight improvement respectively. (Azima and Vispo, 1958: 245)
Given the small and often subtle effects of drugs on mood, sensitive techniques were
needed to detect change. The worth of a scale, therefore, would come to be determined
not by how well it reflected current theories or classifications in psychiatry, but by its
sensitivity to change over a short period. This in turn meant that the content of measures
deemed sensitive to change would begin to mark out the boundaries of depression, and
thereby shape classification. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961),
the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960), and the Wechsler
Depression Rating Scale (DRS; Wechsler, Grosser, and Busfield, 1963), for example,
emerged in the 1960s, all using Likert systems, with a view to detecting changes that
might be induced by either antidepressant drugs or psychological therapies.
Doubts and disagreements about depression types and causes became less relevant as
the new methods allowed depression as a symptom to be universally scaled. Given that
the ‘abnormal’ population was now merging with the ‘normal’ population as a result of
asylum closures (which also reduced the opportunity for clinical observation and hence
clinical judgement), scaling technologies were now the defining feature of psychiatric
research. These scales could at once diagnose (without the need for prolonged daily
observation) and measure intensity of emotions. Their key attribute was the ability to be
sensitive to change. ‘The problem of assessment becomes most crucial in the studies
attempting to evaluate treatment effects, since they require an assessment not only of the
patient’s condition but also of change in that condition’ (Wechsler, Grosser, and Bus-
field, 1963: 335).
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Initially, other than use of the Likert system, the new psychiatric scales for measuring
depression were relatively diverse in content. All tended to have some common items.
The BDI, HRSD, and DRS, for example, all asked about mood, suicidality, loss of
interest or energy, changes in appetite, and weight loss. But then each instrument also
contained additional items that were not shared, such as loss of insight, guilt, low self-
esteem or self-hate, social withdrawal, indecisiveness, sleep disturbance, lack of satis-
faction, sense of punishment, body image, fatiguability, somatic preoccupation, and loss
of libido. The heterogeneous choice of items underpinning each scale did not derive
solely from the perceived nature of depression and/or depressive illness but from ques-
tions that had the potential to be sensitive to change.
Techniques for assessing sensitivity to change had become more sophisticated by the
1970s. The Montgomery Åsberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS; Montgomery and
Åsberg, 1979), for example, included items selected exclusively on the basis of sensi-
tivity to change while also taking into account the correlation between item change and
overall change. This meant that the item ‘reduced sexual interest’ was excluded from the
scale as, while it changed significantly over the course of drug treatment, change was in
the wrong direction: ‘Reduced sexual interest yielded large changes but was less well
correlated to general outcome. Inclusion of an item like this in a scale might spuriously
inflate the change scores’ (ibid.: 384). In effect, the final nine-item questionnaire was not
measuring a clinical or theoretical construct of depression but rather measuring emotions
that changed over the typical four to eight weeks measured in drug trials.
Most of the individual items in the post-war depression detection scales had equiva-
lents in their predecessor personality questionnaires, reframed as things that could have
intensity, frequency, and changeability rather than things that either did or did not reflect
one’s character. Humm and Wadsworth had asked, ‘Do you find yourself at times very
cheerful and at others very “blue”?’ (yes or no). Beck now asked subjects to rate their
‘Mood’ as ‘I do not feel sad’, ‘I feel blue or sad’, ‘I am blue or sad all the time and I can’t
snap out of it’, ‘I am so sad or unhappy that it is very painful’, or ‘I am so sad or unhappy
that I cannot stand it’. Yet, despite these continuities in the item content of question-
naires, the fundamental question had changed. For Humm and Wadsworth, and other
interwar investigators, the question was whether or not the particular respondent had
clinical depression, whereas post-war questionnaires were driven by the need to detect
change. Sadness might therefore have remained a central emotion to elicit, but the
heterogeneity of items in post-war questionnaires reflected the various attempts to iden-
tify new ways of discerning small shifts in mood.
Maintaining internal reliability: Major depressive disorder
When using these new depression scales, individual item scores were summed to create a
total score with proposed cut-off points to indicate levels of severity of depression; thus
‘mild’ and ‘major’ depression could now be precisely defined. A new term, ‘major
depressive disorder’ (MDD), was introduced in the third edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association,
1980), reflecting the new construct of severity made possible by psychometric scales.
Although the new depression scales could capture changes in mood over time, these were
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mood swings within the range of depressed features – the scales could not accommodate
an entirely different dimension of manic symptoms while retaining internal reliability.
‘Bipolar disorder’ (an evolution of ‘cyloid personality’ capturing the idea of extreme
cyclical changes from severe depression to mania) therefore had to be separated from
MDD in the new classification system. DSM-III also introduced ‘dysthymic disorder’,
which was set out in DSM-III as a form of depression that was both more chronic and less
severe than MDD – more in line with the older construct of a depressed ‘personality’.
Depression scales could detect moderate changes over short periods but were impractical
for detecting smaller fluctuations over prolonged periods of years, as implied by
‘dysthymia’.
Depressive personality disorder was not included in DSM-III but reappeared in DSM-
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a set of research criteria with a view to
considering reinstating it in a subsequent version. Items proposed were character
descriptors in the yes/no format, such as ‘Is critical, blaming, and derogatory toward
oneself’ or ‘Is brooding and given to worry’. The concepts captured by these items all
overlapped with the Likert-style items in depression severity scales (such as low mood,
low self-esteem, guilt, self-criticalness, worry, pessimism, guilt, etc.), but were framed
as traits with yes/no responses. This formal separation of permanent personality versus a
treatable condition appears to have come about because of the two different techniques
available for scale construction.
Inter-rater reliability: Discovering unreliable clinicians
Although depression scales were intended to capture patients’ moods by facilitating
emotional introspection and converting this into scores in a questionnaire, not all instru-
ments precluded psychiatric judgement. While the BDI, for instance, was entirely self-
report, the HRSD was based on clinicians asking subjects questions and the clinician
making a rating, whereas the DRS was a combination of both of these, while also
including a number of additional clinical observation items covering the patient’s phys-
ical appearance, observed speech, voice, tension, and so on (the type of observation
previously seen in turn-of-the-century asylum anecdotes). Over previous decades, psy-
chiatry had struggled with the potential unreliability of patients’ reports; but was clinical
judgement, as in mediating patients’ words, equally at risk of unreliability? The problem
was compounded by the considerable expansion of the number of professions involved
in mental health care, now that asylums had been emptied and community mental health
care established. Could all these clinicians be relied upon to make correct judgements?
Concerned about irregular use of the clinician-rated HRSD, Williams published a stan-
dardised structured interview to ensure researchers were applying the HRSD interview
systematically and consistently (Williams, 1988). Further, inter-rater reliability testing
(increasingly used in psychometrics from the 1960s onwards) could be used to demon-
strate that trained raters could be relied on to make judgements similar to those of a more
expert clinician, the latter remaining the gold-standard criterion.
In 2008, Williams also published a structured interview guide for the MADRS (Wil-
liams and Kobak, 2008), as well as a new structured interview guide for the HRSD
(Williams et al., 2008):
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Accumulating evidence suggests that the quality of ratings can make the difference between
a failed trial and one in which drug separates from placebo. Therefore, any method that
improves the quality of clinical trial ratings may improve our ability to conduct successful
antidepressant trials. (Williams and Kobak, 2008: 52)
The ideal measure remained the one that directly captured patients’ reports. Just as the
explosion of investigatory techniques in physical medicine in the second half of the 20th
century interpolated ‘objective’ measures of disease, so the questionnaire that captured
mood offered a means of bypassing the subjectivity of psychiatric judgement. In the
early 21st century, a new measure was developed, the PHQ9 (Kroenke, Spitzer, and
Williams, 2001). This new instrument had nine items, all with an almost exact equivalent
item in the MADRS (developed to prioritise sensitivity to change within drug trials). The
PHQ9 was entirely self-report, requiring no clinician involvement. The purpose was to
create a measure that would detect depression in primary care, where the majority of
mental illness had now come to be managed. The measure needed to be short, since the
HRSD ‘can require 15-30 minutes of clinician time to administer and is therefore not
feasible in many practice settings’ (ibid.: 612). The authors noted that the HRSD
required training and had a complicated scoring system; the MADRS required rating
by a clinician with special training. They considered that the then-popular self-rated BDI
was not adequately sensitive to change. The PHQ9 would, it was claimed, address all of
these issues and provide a tool that would enable greater detection of depression across
primary care settings in a quick, inexpensive, and reliable way. The PHQ9 has since been
used for routine outcome monitoring in the UK primary care psychological therapy
service (Improving Access to Psychological Therapies, IAPT) since 2008 and is recom-
mended as a primary care screening tool by various national bodies, including the
American Psychological Association.
In 2003, the same group also introduced the PHQ2, ‘because even briefer measures
might be desirable for use in busy clinical settings or as part of comprehensive health
questionnaires’ (Kroenke, Spitzer, and Williams, 2003: 1284). Psychometrics now
offered a solution to general practitioner unreliability with their limited training in
psychiatry: statistical techniques to identify the minimal number of items needed to
maximise detection. PHQ2 development work identified two items (low mood and loss
of interest or pleasure) that would identify patients who would score for major depres-
sion if tested on a longer test such as the PHQ9 or by a trained clinician. While the PHQ2
is not a formal requirement for primary care screening in the UK or USA, it reflects the
potential of psychometric advances to impact on the wider conceptualisation of
depression.
Conclusions
Our analysis proposes that the shift from clinical judgement and observation in the
asylum to the psychometrics of ‘normal’ populations reordered the spatial distribution
of mental illness, both geographically and conceptually. Depression became changeable,
indeed treatable, since subjects (now the data source) were inherently unreliable and
changed their accounts frequently. Psychometric techniques of correlation, factor
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analysis, and means of assessing reliability and validity allowed subject unreliability to
be statistically managed and thus to become acceptable for use among psychiatric
populations, even though the assumption remained for some time that clinicians were
naturally the best judges. Variations in scaling techniques enabled the separation of
depressive personality from reactive depression, paving the way for measuring severity
and intensity of emotions. Techniques to test sensitivity to change, along with new
research designs (such as randomised controlled trials), enabled these severity measures
to ‘prove’ the efficacy of the new treatments, which at that time were psychoactive
drugs. Latterly, more advanced techniques of precision scaling made it possible to
manage the new measurement problem of clinician unreliability that resulted from the
growing number of professions and professionals involved in mental health care. This
has left the construct of depression reduced from hundreds of items to potentially just
two that best manage subject and clinician unreliability and, as a further effect, max-
imises the number of subjects under the gaze of mental health professionals.
As noted at the start of this article, there are many alternative accounts of the history
of depression attempting to explain the manufacture of depression as a form of growing
pandemic (e.g. Greenberg, 2010; Rose, 2018). However, in focusing on the social life of
methods, the analysis here emphasises an aspect of the history of psychiatry that is often
elided in more ‘political’ accounts. The development and spread of ‘objective’ methods
of identifying depression, seemingly independent of both practitioners’ and patients’
idiosyncrasies, not only provided the basis for an empirical psychiatry but also appeared
to confirm again and again, in thousands of encounters, the reality of depression. This
‘validated’ construct then became the bedrock for the late 20th-century paradigm of
depression, one that could be challenged or negotiated from within but not from outside.
If huge numbers of patients suffer from depression – as evidenced from questionnaire
data – the reality of the construct and the scale of the problem cannot be ignored.
One of the defining characteristics of recent historical accounts is their critical stance
towards the way in which more and more people are caught in the net of a depression
diagnosis. For some authors, it is sufficient to decry those they hold responsible, often
psychiatrists or, more commonly, the pharmaceutical industry. For others, there is a
belief that underlying the swathe of depression diagnoses is a ‘real’ depression that may
ultimately be identified through some biological characteristics or responsiveness to
certain treatments (Shorter, 2009; Shorter and Fink, 2010), reflecting the ‘evolutionary
criteria for how human beings are biologically designed to behave’ (Horwitz and Wake-
field, 2007). More prosaically, it should be possible to separate out ‘very sick people’
(Hirshbein, 2009: 8). For these critics, it is not the fault of DSM symptom-based diag-
nostic criteria that confused ‘intense normal sadness’ with depressive disorder (Horwitz
and Wakefield, 2007) but the very nature of the continuous distribution of depression
scores derived from psychiatric instruments. Indeed, as Frances (2013: 18) suggests, the
problem is inherent in the shape of that distribution:
This brings us to the question of the moment – can we use statistics in some simple and
precise way to define mental normality? Can the bell curve provide a scientific guide in
deciding who is mentally normal and who is not? Conceptually, the answer is ‘why not’, but
practically the answer is ‘hell no’. . . . The normal curve tells us a great deal about the
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distribution of everything from quarks to koalas, but it doesn’t dictate to us where normal
ends and abnormal begins.
Our analysis proposes that the modern terrain of depression – the continuity between the
abnormal and the normal – is the direct result of psychometric shifts earlier in the 20th
century. In other words, the explanatory frameworks adopted by secondary sources all
start from varying degrees of engagement with the continuous scales of mood that were
invented only a few decades earlier. Once accepted, the outputs from these psychiatric
instruments then become the substrate on which to predicate explanatory models and
apportion responsibility, a story with ‘human action’ at its heart (Herzberg, 2009). The
social life of methods presents a different picture, one in which the inexorable logic of
psychometrics produces its own reality.
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